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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to assess the capability of microfinance as a tool of reconciliation 
through economic activity generation and empowerment in the conflict-affected communities in the Northern 
and Eastern regions of Sri Lanka. The principal data collection tools for this study were Focus Group 
Discussions and Key Informant Interviews. The impact of microfinance engagement is in varying degrees with 
certain areas and groups showing evidence of receiving more beneficial impacts compared to others. It also 
showed very high involvement of women and those women who are active namely, those from groups above 
the very poor and those who have comparatively better educational levels. We found that microfinance 
intervention has both tangible and also created other intangible benefits on clients. The post-conflict 
Northeastern region is not a monolithic entity and there are a number of diverse groups of potential 
beneficiaries with different needs, skills, capacities and opportunities. Therefore, microfinance initiatives 
need to consider these situations and develop their interventions accordingly.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The discourse on microfinance traverses several fields and interconnects with issues of economic 
globalization and neoliberal policies, strategies for poverty and vulnerability reduction, and pathways for 
women’s empowerment. Its credibility has grown over the last few decades, including international 
acceptance of it as a tool for addressing poverty and socio-economic vulnerability. The Microcredit Summit 
held in Washington DC in 1997, recognized it as a “miracle tool” for poverty reduction. It focused on four 
themes – reaching the poorest, the empowerment of women, building self-sufficient financial institutions and 
ensuring a positive and measurable impact on the lives of clients and their families. The United Nations has 
declared that 2005 as the international year of microcredit, which recognized microfinance as an important 
way to meet the millennium development goals, particularly the goal of having the world’s poverty rate by 
2015.It has been recognized that microfinance leads to increase income, helps reduce strains of consumption, 
and reduces the vulnerability of the poor. By providing the poor with financial services that are flexible and 
easy to access and aimed at generating economic activities microfinance is considered as an effective means 
to help break the vicious cycle of poverty. 
 
The original objectives of microfinance which were social upliftment and poverty reduction have expanded 
gradually during the last three decades with microfinance becoming concerned with what the industry 
defines as difficult environments (Morduch, 2000; Woller, Christopher & Warner, 2001). This expansion of 
microcredit services to include non-traditional clientele began in mid 1980 with microfinance institutions 
starting to turn their attention to communities that were threatened by endemic diseases (HIV AIDS) or were 
recovering from a natural disaster or armed conflict. With the ending of conflicts, conflict relief effort shifts 
from saving lives to saving livelihoods with a greater focus on post-conflict economic reconstruction and 
capacity building(Bernal-Garcia, 2008). This necessitates the provision of financial services and microfinance 
is recognized as the effective strategy. As a result, microfinance interventions have become an accepted part 
of the rehabilitation and economic recovery of post-conflict countries. There is debate however over the 
desirability of incorporating peace conditionality into the operation of microfinance services as some 
analysts, especially those who subscribe to financial systems or institutions approach1 that advocate financial 
self sufficiency as an indicator of the success of microfinance institutions(Bernal-Garcia, 2008).  
                                                          
1Though microfinance is making inroads into post conflict environments provision of microfinance services is 
still dominated by financial systems” or “institutionist” approach that advocates profit-seeking and financial 
self sufficiency, a view that came into microfinance service provision.   
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The objective of this paper is to assess the capability of microfinance as a tool of reconciliation through 
economic activity generation and empowerment in the conflict-affected communities in the Northern and 
Eastern regions of Sri Lanka. While the main focus of the paper is the minority Tamils who were by far the 
largest group of victim war from these regions the situation of Muslims who are the second biggest ethnic 
population of these regions and that of the Sinhalese in border areas also is examined. The literature on 
microfinance operations in post-war environments demonstrated that poverty alleviation, peace 
development and vulnerability reduction in these regions, microfinance provides an acceptable mechanism. 
Postwar environments are facing problems such as lack of resources, widespread poverty, income disparities, 
lack of opportunities, peacebuilding and some other critical socioeconomic and political issues. At present, 
almost all of these constraints exist in the Northern and Eastern provinces in Sri Lanka as well. With the 
objective of helping war-affected communities to break the vicious circle of poverty, Sri Lanka introduced a 
series of poverty reduction oriented microfinance programs through formal channels. These include the 
programs by government banks, private commercial banks, Non Governmental Organizations and some other 
social institutions. However, the achievements of microfinance initiatives have been limited, especially in 
terms of reaching the poorest of the poor for whom the programs were designed mainly because some of 
these programs include terms and conditions that are not favorable to poor. Accessibility to the formal 
financial institution to the poor is limited especially, access to the commercial banks. Private commercial 
banks are generally more interested in profit making than service. Therefore, they mainly target the 
commercial sector and largely concentrate on providing commercial and short-term credit to least risk 
sectors, and the elite.   
 
Meanwhile, some of the microfinance institutions realize that banking with the poor can be profitable, but 
only if costs are contained, risks are managed and clients treated as active partners in the conduct of the 
business of the enterprise. Currently, there are several initiatives operating in the sector. Some of them are 
reaching the poor but their initiatives are not financially viable and sustainable. Some are financially viable 
with the government or other subsidies but clients are not satisfied with the services provided. Some of them 
are financially viable and reaching the poor successfully. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to understand 
and identify the ways by which these microfinance initiatives approach their clients and their results, lessons 
and impact on clients’ socio-economic condition. It is important to understand the impact of microfinance 
and, whether the war affected poorest can acquire the benefit from microfinance intervention process in 
terms of increased income, building peace and reduced vulnerability? Accordingly, this study is attempting to 
make a contribution to the discourse on the capability of microfinance as a tool of reconciliation through 
economic activity generation and empowerment in the conflict-affected communities in the Northern and 
Eastern regions of Sri Lanka. This will be useful in designing future programs to replicate these initiatives in 
the future to achieve reconciliation, poverty and vulnerability reduction targets in other regions and contexts. 
The discussion in the paper is divided into five sections. In the first section microfinance as a strategy for the 
upliftment of the poor and vulnerable discussed. In the second part there is a brief examination of 
microfinance activities in Sri Lanka. In the third section the emerging role of microfinance in post-conflict 
environments (PCEs) and the special issues and concerns of microfinance institutions in working in the new 
environment is discussed. The fourth part analyses the problems affecting microfinance interventions in the 
conflict-affected areas in the North and East of Sri Lanka and potential for better engagement and also 
proposes a model for microfinance intervention in post-conflict environments. The section five in addition to 
provided conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Microfinance as a Means of Helping the Poor and a Strategy to bring Economic Development: 
Microfinance broadly defined is a type of banking service which provides access to financial and non-financial 
services to poor and vulnerable groups with the aim of improving their economic and social condition(Otero 
& Rhyne, 1994). The financial services provided by microfinance institutions may include accepting deposits 
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and provision of credits, payment services to the poor and low-income households and their 
microenterprises. Non-financial service on the other hand may include depending on the operational context. 
Services such as those related to the delivery of financial service to those others that improve general social 
conditions of target communities such as health education, maternal and child healthcare, literacy, language 
training, legal advice and different kinds of personal mentoring, and micro-entrepreneurial development 
services, involving financial, business or technical skills training. The wide variety of existing credit-plus 
activities responds to the belief that microfinance does not always sufficiently improve the living standards of 
its clients and also for the fact that effective use of financial services need several social skills and resources 
that the target communities lack (Herath, 2015; Marconi & Mosely, 2006). The objective of these non-
financial services is to serve as a long term support to help these communities get the best out of financial 
services. They therefore can be seen as preparing for the main objective. Microfinance institutions be they a 
bank, a cooperative, a credit union, and Non Governmental Organization (NGO) or some other form of non-
bank financial intermediary, seek to provide clients or low income households with a range of money 
management and banking services. Broadly, all microfinance providers can be classified into three categories 
based on their main sources of funding. They are (1) all microfinance providers who depend on other 
people’s money (can be domestic or foreign) to finance their lending activities, (2) formal microfinance 
providers which use members’ money to grant loans exclusively to members, and (3) microfinance providers 
that use the general public’s money to finance their lending businesses. Based on the functional and activities 
implementing MFIs can be classified as formal institutions, semi-formal institutions and informal institutions.   
 
Microfinance is a development strategy aimed at improving the life of poor and disadvantaged segments of 
society. The argument of micro-finance is that, the one of the major reasons of poverty is lack of access to 
credit for those who belong to low income and socially disadvantaged groups. If these people are provided 
with access to financial assistance, including credit, they will be able to start or expand a micro-enterprise 
that will allow them to break out of the vicious circle of poverty. In this sense microfinance interventions are 
core to poverty alleviation efforts. Provision of microfinance service are expected not only help people out of 
poverty but also through improvement in economic conditions to enable them to take control of their lives. 
Therefore, microfinance is also considered as a means of empowerment of the disadvantaged social segments, 
not only the poor but also other groups such as women. Poverty is the condition where people are unable to 
meet basic needs of food, clothing and shelter and its main indicator is low income. Yet poverty is not a 
problem of income but also about access to resources in general. Poor people lack social capital that 
effectively prevents them from accessing services which in turn stand in their way in their effort to improve 
their life conditions. Poverty is also about the ability to take decisions with regard to life matters of the poor. 
Poverty also is characterized by social exclusion preventing the poor from integrating not only into 
mainstream life but also shutting them out of essential services of which exclusion from financial services is 
the major barrier (Muneer et al., 2017). Poor people are in that position not only for income poverty but also 
for social poverty (lack of social capital) and by products of these two, namely, social exclusion2 and inability 
control their life choices. Therefore, poverty is also a problem of power, the root cause of which is the low 
income (income poverty). It is the argument of microfinance that by providing access to easy and flexible 
financial service, the poor can be made to take up microenterprises leading to economic improvement that in 
turn would result in creating enabling effect on individuals making them empowered. Therefore, provision of 
microenterprise, especially its success, needs to be understood in relation to this enabling effect, namely, 
empowerment.  
 
Empowerment is the process through which people acquire more influence over factors that shape their lives 
(Rappaport, 1986; Whitmore, 1988). Empowerment enables people to break the grip of exclusion and take 
control of their lives. Empowerment therefore is an enabling process that increases the status of people to 
live their life with dignity, humanity, respect, self esteem and self reliance. The poor and the vulnerable are 
the most affected by lack of power to control factors affecting their lives and therefore among those who are 
mostly in need of empowerment. Microfinance is regarded as one such policy that seeks to empower those 
                                                          
2 The focus on financial aspects in the alleviation of poverty is disputed (see (Christen & Drake, 2002; 
Littlefield, Morduch, & Hashemi, 2003; RIMHI, 1999). 
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who do not have resources, economic, social and psychological, to take control over their lives. Empowerment 
therefore reduces vulnerability3 which is an aspect of poverty that relates to risks, shocks, stresses and 
internal defenselessness (Lock-Desallien, 1996).  It is widely accepted that the microfinance programs have 
greater empowering potential on women who are a marginalized segment, both economically and socially, all 
societies. Microfinance services enable women to develop their own income-generating new economic 
activities, and thereby making them play a greater role in decision making (as greater bargaining power 
within the household and leadership in the community) and making attitudinal changes (increased self-
reliance, self-confidence and self-worth). Further, small groups, which form the foundation of most 
microfinance programs, empower women through mutual support, exchanging of new ideas, group 
responsibility and leadership (Herath et al., 2016). 
 
Microfinance with the general goal of improving economic and social condition of the poor and 
empowerment of members, especially women, in these communities began in Bangladesh in the 1980s with 
the establishment of the Grameen Bank movement. Today the strategy has received international legitimacy 
and adopted as not only a poverty alleviation strategy but also alternative development model for holistic 
development. By the end of 2000 microfinance serviced had reached over 79 million people of the world’s 
poor and the disadvantaged (Noreen, 2011). Further, microfinance operations that initially developed as a 
donor supported provision of financial services with equal weight for both social and financial objectives 
have gradually moved towards adopting more financial operation focused approach lately. Today there are 
two views on the operational strategies that debate on the extent to which microfinance institutions should 
be self sufficient financially. In this there are two schools of thought with one focusing on giving primacy to 
financial operations and claiming that MFIs should be profit oriented and self financing and the other 
claiming that microfinance should adopt a more holistic approach of support with broad social objectives 
going beyond commercial objectives and profit (Meehan & Jennifer, 1999; Morduch, 2000; Shaw & Matthew, 
n.d; Woller et al., 2001). These two are variously known as financial systems or institutions/minimalist 
approach and welfare based approach have dominated the discourse on microfinance since the 1990s.Apart 
from the disagreement on the financial operations related objectives there is an agreement among 
proponents of microfinance service that the core objective of microfinance services is making poor people 
easy access to financial services for microeconomic activities. 
 
Access to finance can be defined as “availability of a supply of reasonable quality financial services at 
reasonable costs, where reasonable quality and reasonable cost have to be defined relative to some objective 
standard, with costs reflecting all pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs” (Claessens, 2006). Access to finance 
has numerous benefits. But less than half of the households in developing countries have access to financial 
services, compared to over 70 percent in the developed world. It is estimated that only one out of every eight 
people who could benefit from microcredit currently has access to it. By 2006, there were 3,316 microfinance 
institutions with more than 133 million members worldwide. Of these, 69.8 percent were among the poor 
(defined as earning less than US$ 1 a day). Women accounted for 85 percent of poor clients. As regards 
households, however, the figures tell a slightly different story. Of the 193.6 million poor families worldwide, 
only 47.8 percent were within reach of microfinance institutions. 
 
Microfinance in Post Conflict Environment (PCE): Microfinance is increasingly being recognized as a 
useful strategy in the recovery process in post conflict environments (PCEs). It can be an effective means of 
providing relief and rehabilitation support that are required in the short-term recovery process and strategy 
with high potential to help boost socio-economic development in the long-term by providing access to 
financial services to encourage microenterprises(Bernal-Garcia, 2008). While it is generally recognized that 
microfinance operates under similar principles in both stable and conflict-affected contexts, employing 
microfinance as a tool in post conflict environments need to consider that PCEs are not normal 
                                                          
3(World-Bank, 2002) defines vulnerability as the expected welfare loss resulting from unexpected events and 
lack of insurance against them. (Chambers, 1995) explains that vulnerability as having an  external side 
(exposure to shocks, stress, and risk) and internal side (defenselessness, meaning a lack of means to cope 
without damaging loss). 
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disadvantaged/vulnerable communities whose main feature is poverty and associated problems such as lack 
of resources and capacities. Armed conflicts have devastating consequences on socioeconomic development 
of affected communities. PCEs are characterized by widespread destruction of physical infrastructure and 
other support systems of which financial and trade operation are the most important, a severely traumatized 
and dehumanized civilian population, often with a large scale refugee component and social relationships 
weakened by mistrust and suspicion. In some cases, there may be even ongoing pockets of armed conflict. 
The primary goal of microfinance which is income enhancement and vulnerability reduction requires to be 
supplemented by social capital building and other support strategies (Doyle, 1998).  
 
PCEs are in extremely disadvantaged situation compared to other vulnerable societies where microfinance is 
used a strategy of socio-economic development, not only in terms of extremely poor physical infrastructure, 
economic and organizational structures of diminished capacity, but also with weakened social capital through 
loss of trust, diminished interaction and weakened networks and increased tensions between different 
communities and  groups, and in declining human capital through death and displacement, loss of self-
esteem, and trauma.  Add to these is the fact that these adverse impacts mostly affect the poor stratum of 
society who always are the most affected by armed conflicts. Conflict erodes the financial, economic and 
social capital of the poor and weakens their organizations thereby adding to their vulnerability. This situation 
requires microfinance work in post conflict environments to invest heavily on preparatory work such as 
capacity building (Wilson, 2001; Wlliams, Uch, & Soeng, 2001). Therefore it is generally recognized that post 
conflict societies are characterized by high operating costs for microfinance institutions (Shaw & Matthew, 
n.d). In PCEs non-financial services such as training, business development and social intermediation 
therefore are a must if microfinance work to be successful through they do not generate commercial rates of 
return. It is in this context the practicality of the dominant minimalist approach which focuses on financial 
best practices in post conflict environment is questioned by analysts. 
 
The role of microfinance in PCE is in reconstruction and recovery at community-level and household-level. At 
this level for its special situation strategies addressing special vulnerabilities and lack of resources require 
prominence than in normal contexts of poverty and vulnerability. According to analysts this involves 
reconsideration of goals of microfinance in actual implantation of strategies in PCE. On the one hand the 
protectional objectives of microfinance (addressing issues of vulnerability) such as consumption oriented 
financing, subsistence production and risk-spreading diversification of household income becomes important 
(Doyle, 1998; Sebstad & Monique, 2000; Wilson, 2001). On the other hand, secondary order goals of social 
capital building and capacity functions of microfinance also need to be accorded prominence. As Doyle (1998) 
correctly says there is a case for sequencing post-conflict microfinance interventions to focus initially on 
protection and subsequently, with the rebuilding of household asset bases and revival of economic activity, to 
shift the focus towards sustained income promotion. The stepwise implantation microfinance starting with 
protectional strategies of re-building of livelihoods, assisting clients to reach a threshold of income security 
from which they can launch higher-risk, higher-return income-generating therefore may be the suitable 
strategy in post conflict environments activities (Sebstad & Monique, 2000).  
 
3. Methodology 
 
The principal data collection tools for this study were Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant 
Interviews. Small-scale entrepreneurs from villages in the war-affected regions in the country, including 
border villages, were selected purposely in consultation with microfinance service providers who were active 
in Community Based Organizations. Altogether ten Focus Group Discussions were conducted; two in 
Batticaloa District, two in Trincomalee District, one each in Ampara, Mullaitive, Mannar, Kilinochchi and 
Jaffna Districts and one in a border village in Anuradhapura in the North Central Province. The Batticaloa and 
Trincomalee are the fully conflict affected and largest Districts in the two regions. Focused group discussions 
in Batticaloa4 and Trincomalee were mixture of Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslim while those in the Northern 
                                                          
4There were several Tamils of mixed Portuguese parentage (Batticaloa Burgers) in one Focus Group 
Discussions conducted in Batticaloa.  
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Province were exclusively Tamil and the one in the border village (Anuradhapura) was exclusively Sinhalese. 
Accordingly, we have maintained the ethnic-wise war affected community representation in the sample. All 
Focus Group Discussions were conducted in informal settings, often a residence of an entrepreneur or an 
office of a community based organizations. This method was mainly covered the demand side data and 
information for the analysis of client’s perception regarding impacts, strengths and weaknesses of 
microfinance practices in the regions. Not more than 10 individuals were present at any one of the Group 
Discussions. Some of those who took part in the discussions have had experience in doing small-scale 
business before starting their present activity but the majority was newcomers with no experience at all. 
While the main focus of the discussions was on their experience as small scale entrepreneurs who were 
receiving microfinance support there were some discussions about their wartime experience and its impact 
on their present activities and socioeconomic condition. 
 
Key Informant Interviews were conducted with community based organization officials, Grama Niladari and 
representatives of government banks, private banks, non-governmental organizations and non-financial 
institutions covering all the Districts to assess the service provisions from institutional point of view, namely, 
the nature of the service offered and also institutions related problems and difficulties operating in a situation 
where social issues like weakened infrastructure and general services and also strict security conditions. This 
method was applied mainly to cover the supply-side information required for the analysis. 100 officials of 
100 branches of 20 microfinance organizations and 40 other government and private sector officials were 
interviewed. This sample selection is also maintained the district wise representation and expansion of 
branches of each organization. Further, the data collected through Focus Group Discussions were 
triangulated using the information obtained from key informants and information available in secondary 
sources. The interviews with government officials, bank personnel and representatives of nonbanking 
financial institutions were also used to collect secondary data about loan disbursement and repayment rate.  
Though the researchers would have liked to interview the security establishment, the circumstances, namely, 
the inability to get required approval from Colombo prevented it. In additions, several microfinance 
supported establishments were visited in order to assess the operational conditions and which also gave the 
researchers opportunity to conduct some casual discussions with the workers.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
Microfinance Actors and Activities in Sri Lanka: In Sri Lanka, the origin of microfinance services can be 
outlined back to the early 1900s. In 1911, the British government passed legislation to set up credit co-
operatives in Sri Lanka. However, the government did not interfere with the activities of the co-operatives in 
the initial phase up to 1942. Traditional village leaders like landlords and village headmen dominated the co-
operative societies. These societies did not show much growth during the initial phase. Following the food 
shortages originated from the Second World War, the government got involved in the co-operative movement 
in the second phase that began in 1942 by bringing in initiatives like co-operative Agriculture Production and 
Sales Societies (CAPS) and provided credit facilities to them. As practiced today microfinance activity in Sri 
Lanka is both a traditional community activity and a tool for economic development, with the clientele being 
mainly the poor. Service is provided by a broad range of different organizations for purposes of poverty 
alleviation, social and community development and as a multi-faceted intervention tool in areas affected by 
conflict. On the whole microfinance intermediaries in Sri Lanka can be categorized into four groups as 
professional national level microfinance institutions, local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and government programs. These institutions/ 
programs vary largely in terms of their sources of funding, clientele, coverage, legal, and organizational 
structure, key stakeholders, main activities and services provided to target individuals/ households.  
 
In the post independence period, the government concentrated largely on agricultural credit, particularly for 
paddy cultivation. These credit facilities were granted mainly through two state banks, the Bank of Ceylon 
and the Peoples’ Bank at subsidized interest rates under various rural credit schemes with funds provided by 
the Central Bank. In 1964 the government established the Co-operative Rural Banks (CRBs) which was a 
major contribution in the field of microfinance. However, microfinance, in its strict sense, was not present in 
Sri Lanka until 1986. During 1986-1991 the government initiated an arrangement of policy measures to 
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expand credit facilities to the poor under its poverty alleviation strategy. The Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank initiated the Regional Rural Development Banks (RRDBs) in 1986 as part of these initiatives. As 
a major poverty alleviation strategy, the government also launched the Janasaviaya Program in 1989 under 
which the beneficiaries were assisted with credit facilities for viable self-employment projects with a view to 
promoting income generating activities on a sustainable basis. The government expanded this work by 
establishing the Janasaviya Trust Fund (JTF) in 1990. The Small Farmers and Landless Credit Project were 
launched by the Central Bank in 1991. All these programs had some form of microfinance component. 
 
In 1996, the government replaced the Janasaviya Program with the Samurdhi Development and Credit 
Scheme to promote income generating self-employment opportunities among the poor so as to raise their 
income levels. In 1997, the government established the Samurdhi Authority and its microfinance scheme 
under which the beneficiaries were eligible to obtain loans of up to Rs. 10,000 for undertaking a new income 
generating activity or expanding an existing business. As part of this venture Samurdhi Bank Societies (SBS) 
were set up throughout the country to promote savings and to disburse credit. Microfinance initiatives have 
now expanded and the other major institutions and programs that provide microfinance facilities today 
include Commercial Banks, Regional Development Banks, Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise Development 
Services (SEEDS), Gami Pubuduwa Scheme, Thrift and Credit Co-operative Societies (TCCSs), Janasakthi 
Banking Societies (in Hambantota) and Women’s Development Federation (in Hambantota). Apart from these 
major Micro Finance Initiatives (MFIs), there are Hundreds of domestic and international organizations 
involved in small credit delivery spread all over the country.  
 
The current laws of Sri Lanka do not permit NGO’s to take deposits even from its members as the Banking and 
Finance Act of 1998 restricts deposits to only banks and finance companies. This prohibition covers all 
aspects of savings whether it is from members or non members or whether it is as a guarantee for a loan or 
not. If NGO’s take any deposits, then they must deposit them in turn in regulated financial institutions and are 
not permitted to lend even a part of them. This is a major problem faced by locally based microfinance 
operators who face severe supply issues. This situation is further confounded by the fact that the NGO sector 
which is the main supplier of funds for small time local MFIs is also constrained by shortages of funds. In 
terms of current involvement of the government in microfinance, the Central Bank Rural Credit Department 
remains the key government agency responsible for rural credit and for microfinance outside the Samurdhi 
Authority. In fact, the difference in emphasis between rural credit and microfinance showed that no 
government agency is responsible for or focused on policy aspects of microfinance exclusively. In 1992, the 
Presidential Commission on Banking and Finance recommended that the Central Bank of Sri Lanka confine 
itself to its traditional supervisory role and shed its development role. Despite this, it began a new 
microfinance project, Poverty Alleviation Microfinance Project (PAMP), with Japanese funding and also 
continued to implement the Small Farmers and Landless Credit Program, and own majority shares in the 
RDBs.   
 
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka, which is the government agency responsible for the supervision of banking 
and non banking agencies, has no capacity to supervise the large spectrum of microfinance agencies and the 
work spread all over the country. The Cooperative Department, responsible for supervising key agencies such 
as the CRBs and TCCS is equally incapable of even auditing its agencies. Thus, microfinance in Sri Lanka is by 
and large an unsupervised, unregulated area. Despite the substantial growth of microfinance in Sri Lanka in 
the last 20 years there has been no attempt to regulate the institutions providing this service. The key reason 
why some regulations are required is the huge amount of savings that the poor entrust to these organizations. 
As the individual amounts are small from a national perspective the key agencies such as Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka of the Finance Ministry do not appear to give this issue sufficient attention. At the moment there are no 
or only a very few safeguards for savers in these schemes including all NGO programs, the Cooperative 
Programs and even some of the government programs. As a result, many NGO’s and even TCCSs have folded 
their operations but as the numbers are small no one is aware of the fact. This could become a serious 
problem in future. Compare with other countries, Sri Lanka has developed a highly diversified microfinance 
system in the region. A study of the supply of microfinance which was commissioned by GTZ ProMis indicated 
that around 9,000 access points were available throughout the country(GTZ, 2008). The World Bank’s study 
of Country-level Effectiveness and Accountability Review, conducted in 2006, demonstrated that 14,000 
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access points.  However, by international standards the country’s microfinance services operate at a low level. 
The core problem is the poor quality of the microfinance services offered, indicated by insufficient reaching 
out, low repayment, low cost efficiency and financial products which not client driven. This situation seriously 
threatens the sustainability of the offered financial services and their outreach to poorer households, micro 
and small enterprises. High costs and limited access to finance are the two of the most crucial obstacles faced 
by beneficiaries, especially those in rural areas.  
 
The main causes of the poor performance of microfinance institutions lie in the inadequate qualification of 
the microfinance institution staff and the fact that the government of Sri Lanka has not yet designed a 
national sector policy for a sustainable microfinance sector. Another problem lies in the lack of an organized 
regulatory and supervisory structure which encompasses all microfinance institutions. While commercial 
banks engaged in the microfinance business are regulated and supervised by the Central Bank, and the work 
of savings and credit of co-operative societies are supervised by the Department of Co-operative 
Development, and Samurdhi Banks by the Samurdhi Authority of Sri Lanka. There is neither supervision nor 
regulation of microfinance services provided by international NGOs although they mobilize saving deposits 
from the general public. The microfinance service providers in the public sector are weakened by politically 
motivated debt relief often ahead of elections which seriously endangers the repayment culture among its 
clientele. Another cause is the insufficient infrastructure for training, further education and advisory services 
to provide immediate and relevant practical advice. The negative impacts which results from all of the above 
are the insufficient supply of financial services to needy people in the society and micro and small 
enterprises.     
 
Over the past three decades, microfinance institutions in Sri Lanka have adopted innovative modes of 
providing services to the poor entrepreneurs. Two main approaches on the role of microfinance 
intermediation in poverty reduction can be identified5. In terms of the first approach that is portrayed as the 
financial best practice focused Institutionist Approach where the microfinance institutions offer only financial 
services in the form of credit. These microfinance institutions are unwilling to provide non-financial services 
due to multiple reasons ranging from high administrative costs to high transaction costs. In that sense, the 
primary focus of these microfinance institutions is institutional profit disregarding the social and poverty 
alleviation dimension of microfinance. The alternative to this approach which places high importance on 
social objectives is also practiced and often referred to as the Welfarist Approach is also practiced by some 
microfinance providers, especially NGO sector in Sri Lanka. According to the latter, the provision of credit 
alone will not guarantee that the recipients of credit use scarce capital in productive manner so that the 
recovery of loans is not ensured. It is interesting to note that these services are increasingly being recognized 
as an important component of microfinance intermediation as they are associated with the viability and 
sustainability of the enterprise. Moreover, it is believed that the viability and sustainability of enterprises will 
in turn ensure financial viability and sustainability of the relevant microfinance institutions (Herath, 2015; 
Remenyi, 2002).  
 
Nearly 80 percent of Sri Lankan households, including more than 70 percent of low-income households, have 
access to some form of saving services. The Sri Lankan financial market is essentially a microfinance market 
with over 80 percent of households having total borrowings below Rs. 100,000 (GTZ, 2008).Female’s 
participation in microfinance programs in Sri Lanka is very high compared with male participants (GTZ, 
2010). The following table (Table 1) demonstrates that microfinance institutions such as TCCSs, PAMP, SFLCP 
and SEEDS captured very high percentage of female clients. High repayment culture is one of the major 
                                                          
5 In the broad category of the commercial/institutionist approach there are two broad strategies, one that 
focuses on providing credit only (minimalist)  and the other with primary objective of credit but providing 
support services such as capacity building to make credit, especially recovery, more successful (credit plus).  
are the strategies variously known as minimalist approach and credit-plus approach. The second category of 
approaches includes zero interest strategies and charity based strategies focusing on social objectives of 
improving living conditions in its holistic sense, not just economic. As these do not have financial viability as 
main focus they need to depend on donor funds. 
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reasons for increased women’s participation in microfinance in Sri Lanka. In addition, some of international 
NGOs and programs purposely targeted women according to their program objectives and aims.  
 
Table 1: Women’s Participation in the Selected Credit Programs as at December 2007 
 Institution No. of loans Value 
Rs. Million 
% received 
by women Male Female Total 
 RDBs    50,804   43,277   94,081   1,614 46.00 
 LCBs N.A* N.A* N.A* N.A* N.A* 
 SDB 
TCCSs 
321,687 
  36,726 
246,896 
  85,696 
568,583 
122,422  
13,000 
  2,816 
43.42 
70.00 
 CRBs 316,142 135,490 451,632   8,999 30.00 
 PAMP   12,604     39,388   51,992   1,058.4 75.76 
 SFLCP        669     8,681       9,350                  244.5  92.84 
 SEEDS   11,540   23,081    34,621   1,986 66.67 
N.A* - refers to the non-availability of disaggregated data  
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Repot (2008).  
 
It also must be noted here that microfinance industry having reached a certain maturity level in Sri Lanka, has 
now gone beyond the area of micro credit and into financial services that cover micro savings, micro credit, 
and micro insurance.    
 
Economy and Livelihoods in Conflict Affected Areas: Of the population of Northern and Eastern provinces 
around 80% is employed in agricultural crops, livestock and fisheries production. Out of those, 72 percent are 
homesteaders with less than 0.1 ha of back garden. Approximately 15-20 percent of the agricultural areas 
(comprising highly productive arable land) consists of high security zones and cannot be used for cultivation 
or for any other productive activities. There are also areas that still not cleared of landmines. Around thirty 
years of violent conflict coupled with the large scale and widespread destruction brought by the 2004 
Tsunami also has taken its toll on the economy, primarily on agricultural production, of North and Eastern 
Provinces Sri Lanka. Together with the on-going assistance for resettlement, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation, there is a need to increase economic production for general improvement of living conditions 
of the people in the provinces. Strengthening of the small businesses sector by supporting locally 
manufactured agro-based products and improving of market opportunities is crucial for economic stability of 
the productive sectors. There is also an urgent need to increase agricultural productivity in order to improve 
food security among the affected population.  
 
North and East are part of the dry zone of the country and economy is dominantly agriculture. In the 
Northern Province agriculture contributes around 28% to region GDP yet 38% of employed population was 
in agriculture (Sarvanathan, 2007). North and east are significant producers of food, cash crops, livestock and 
fish. The major agricultural crops are rice, union, green chili, potatoes and tobacco. The region accounts for 
1/3 of rice production of the country. As its population is only 15% country’s population there is a surplus.  
North and East has been the largest livestock producer since independence. Animal husbandry consists of 
cattle rearing, goat/sheep farming and chicken. Buffalos are also kept but mainly in the east.  According to 
recent data cattle and chicken are the most popular animal husbandry practice in the region with about 
500,000 heads of cattle farmed mainly for milk and over 1.6 million chickens for meat and eggs. There are 
also about 170,000 heads of sheep of which around half is in Jaffna.  
 
The second biggest livelihood of the region is fishing with sector contributing 12% to the GDP of the North 
East and has around 110,000 fishermen of which around 60% is in the East. Fish production was severely 
affected during the conflict due to restrictions imposed by the government. With advent of peace the 
production has picked up and today the two provinces account for 35% of marine fish production of the 
county. The total marine fish production from the region in 2011 was 134,690 MT of which the Eastern 
Provinces share was 88,320 MT (65.5%).  Fishing in the region is done using mainly small mechanized fiber 
glass boats and mechanized and non mechanized traditional crafts. Over 50% fishing vessels in Batticaloa are 
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non mechanized traditional craft. Due to these technological constraints fishing is still carried out in near sea. 
Of economic activities industrial sector is the least developed. Since the construction of the cement factory in 
Kankasanthrurai in Jaffna there has not been any industries established in the Eastern Province by the 
government. The Industrial work force in the region is employed in micro small and medium enterprises the 
majority of which was either destroyed or damaged during the conflict. Statistics also show that during the 
conflict industry related employment halved from 8% to 4.4% with the biggest decrease in Jaffna, Batticaloa 
and Ampara (Sarvanathan, 2007). 
 
Even before the conflict the economy of the North and East was going through changes resulting from the 
economic reforms brought in by the government that came into power in 1977. The impact of these policies 
however affected the North and the East differently. Unlike the economy of the country that saw fundamental 
changes in the composition of the economic production with the share of agriculture of the GDP which was 
30% in 1970 coming down in 2005 to 18% and that of service increasing from 43% to 55% the same did not 
happen in the North and East. In the North and East, the share of agriculture remained around 35% of the 
regional GDP with the weak service sector and industrial sector continuing. The impact of liberalization was 
felt in the Tamil speaking North and Eastern region in a different way. It severely affected the market in the 
South for the northern producer, especially Jaffna farmer. Liberalization of imports in late 1970s resulted in 
the decline of the South’s dependence on of Jaffna agricultural produce. Conflict added to these problems by 
paralyzing the already affected northern economy. It destroyed much of the infrastructure of the region. 
North South links, transport of goods and people and also communication, were severely disrupted and came 
to near total stand still during the height of the war. Closure of A9 road and damage to the railway line 
stopping the service altogether and embargo of sending goods and restriction on fishing which is the main 
livelihood of people in the coastal areas, by the government and LTTE placing similar restrictions severely 
damaged the economy of the region. The thriving agriculture based economy that prospered and supplied the 
south with its many agricultural produce transformed from a successful commercial mode of production to 
survival mode of production as a result of the conflict (Sarvanathan, 2007). 
 
Four years after the war short-term needs have been answered to a large extent through various programs. 
There are at present two major programs for reconstruction of the former war areas; one for the East is called 
Neganahira Navodaya (Eastern Awakening) and the other is called Uthuru Vasanthaya (Northern Spring). 
Both are government funded programs of development aimed at rebuilding the destroyed infrastructural 
facilities, mainly the road network and power and water supply. In addition, there are also livelihood 
development programs, notable among them are Gamaneguma and Gemidiriya working in tandem with 
government’s major poverty alleviation program Samadhi. There are also other development attempts that 
target specific areas and activities like the Arugam Bay and Pasikudatourist promotion zones, Trincomalee 
special economic zone covering 675 sq.km of area and Kilinochchi 300 acre agro economic zone. The conflicts 
affected not only in the Northern and Eastern provinces and neither the Tamil community alone in the 
country. It also affected the so called border villages in the boundaries of these two provinces. These are 
dominated by the majority Sinhalese and agricultural (mainly paddy) settlements. A substantial number of 
villages are new settlements established since the independence. The Muslim community also affected by the 
conflict with 90,000 Muslims expelled from Jaffna by the LTTE and large areas of the Eastern Province which 
were home to the Muslims physically threatened by the LTTE and the population being displaced. Paddy 
cultivation in Ampara was the most affected. The Muslims expelled from Jaffna are still languishing in camps 
in the North Western coastal belt of the country, especially in Puttalam. Their removal created a vacuum in 
the economy of Jaffna town by removing a very enterprising population involved in trade. This no doubt 
affected the market links with the south which is a major market for agricultural produce of the Northern 
region.  
 
War did not affect all regions of the North and the East equally. North was more affected as the center of 
militant activities. The District of Kilinochchi where the LTTE headquarters was and the District of Mullaitivu 
received the brunt of the last battle with extreme devastation of life and property. Over 250,000 civilians 
were displaced during the last stages of the war mainly from these two Districts. Unlike that Jaffna which is 
the capital of the Northern Province since 1995 was under government control and was relatively free of 
large scale conflict. Trincomalee the capital of the Eastern Province was also relatively unscathed. Compared 
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to the North the effect of the conflict in the East was less. Except for parts of rural Batticaloa and Trincomalee 
outlying areas of the east was free of conflict since mid 1990 and was almost totally free since 2006. In 
addition to the economy and general services and public entitlements like Samurdhi and other poverty 
alleviation and welfare programs were not operative in almost totally in Mannar, Mullaitive and Killinochchi 
and partly in other areas. Population displacement was another problem. Alternatively, Diasporas are also 
found be having a positive effect on the home country though in the Sri Lankan context the role of the Tamil 
Diaspora is seen in a negative light for their role in supporting the militants. They bring money into the 
household and through that to the economy. Among the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora this role was important. 
During the conflict period they not only supported the militancy but also supported the households and the 
community through different type of active engagements like building services and facilities. Home Village 
Associations, Old Boys/Girls Organizations Tamil Diaspora found to playing an important role in the life of the 
people that have a cushioning effect on the life of the people in the area and also that can be harnessed is for 
success of future activities. Tamils in Canada have provided substantial funds for humanitarian assistance and 
play an important role in development effort (Cheran, 2007; Wimalaraja & Cheran, 2010). While militancy 
role is no more and active community engagement has come down for the obvious reasons the support from 
the household remains at the same level.  
 
Microfinance Actors, Strategies and its Impacts on Communities in Conflict Affected Areas: Yet the 
conflict kept away the main government sponsored microfinance initiatives reaching the potential 
beneficiaries during the conflict. Although continued access to finance was provided by local cooperatives, 
many branches had to be closed down and others to severely restrict their operations. Commercial banks 
provided saving facilities, but access to credit and credit-plus services remained difficult therefore the little 
microfinance initiatives during the conflict period were the ones sponsored by the NGO sector and funded 
through international donors and relief and development agencies. While the government sponsored 
programs are making their entry with the end of the war still microfinance services are primarily provided by 
the NGO sector. During the conflict, financial services in the region faced severe constraints owing to the acts 
of both the government and the militants. The result was once vibrant credit operations coming to a standstill 
and the region being deprived of the benefits of early attempts by the government to introduce microfinance 
in the country.  Now that the conflict is over microfinance services are entering the regions. While the prewar 
credit culture is a potential plus factor for their work the conflict caused damage makes it necessary for the 
post conflict microfinance initiatives to adopt strategies to suit the conditions presented by the post conflict 
environment. The destruction of the physical infrastructure apart there are other adverse conditions such as 
the breakdown of the support services, especially financial service, shortage of personnel with skills caused 
by migration, greatly reduced opportunities for economic activities, weakened market (displacement and 
migration) and also disillusioned and traumatized population is severally hampering the efforts of newly 
entered microfinance operators. It is therefore not surprising to see a plethora of strategies that are being 
tried by different initiatives in this context.  
 
The operators of microfinance programs in the North and East are mixed group that include banks, 
authorized non-banking sector operators like finance companies and leasing companies, International Donor 
Organizations and operators in the Non Governmental sector both local and international. This latter group 
includes local, regional and national level organizations who depend on external funding and large 
international NGOs who either operate on their own or through local agents.  The strategies of microfinance 
initiatives in the north and east of the country can be seen as influenced by two factors, namely, the mission 
and the objectives of the service provider and the ground realties. Banks and other financial service providers 
have generally employ various shades of credit only strategies. Their approach could be called 
institutionist/minimalist in broad sense yet some of them provide some non-financial services as well (credit 
plus). The International NGOs, national NGOs, and UN and other bilateral donors on the other hand pay equal 
attention to financial best practices and social best practices both. There are also small local level NGOs with 
primary focus on relief and welfare while providing credit. The latter two groups of operators were providing 
similar services when there was ongoing conflict. International operators carry out their services either 
directly with their own schemes, like the GTZ or through local organizations that are funded by them. The 
biggest nongovernmental local operators are the Sarvodaya SEEDS, Seva Lanka and Sanasa/TCCCs (GTZ, 
2010). In addition, the state sector also funds initiatives through local banks and also as part of general 
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poverty alleviation programs the most active of these are the Samurdhi and Gemidiriya. A distinct 
characteristic of the conflict environment was that most microfinance clients were relatively well-off before 
the conflict but fell into poverty as a result of the conflict. Therefore, when they returned to their homeland, 
they only needed a kick-start to recommence productive economic activities, in sharp distinction with the 
slower commencement of persistent poor elsewhere.  
 
Almost all microfinance initiatives in conflict areas use group loan approach to deliver their services. 
Members of a group loan facility can vary and are from a homogeneous group who come together to obtain 
credit to address their common economic problems. The groups that are commonly found in the region are, in 
addition to the five-member group, a format that was popularized by the countries pioneering poverty 
alleviation program Janasavia, SHGs, CBOs and other traditional village based volunteer organizations. The 
format depends on objectives of the livelihood program, funding source, target group, and service delivering 
methodology of the operator. They are encouraged to make voluntary savings on a regular basis but this is 
not mandatory and sometimes it is not even possible as some microfinance operators are not authorized to 
keep deposits. Operators provide credit from the savings if that is allowed under the law or from funds 
received from other agencies including banks. This process i.e. saving, lending, and recovering setting terms 
and conditions and keeping financial accounts helps in building financial discipline and more importantly, 
credit history for members themselves. Group members also learn to handle larger sums of money which are 
much beyond their individual savings. This process also makes them understand the basic principle of 
banking that money has a time value and is a scare resource. Poor women are particularly empowered by this 
type of microcredit strategy, as it gives them ability to earn an income and thus improve their bargaining 
positions vis-a-vis their male partners and in the community as well. This finding, which is in consisting 
withHerath (2015) and Noreen (2011), concluded that poor and vulnerable women having positive impacts 
by microfinance intervention for their livelihood development. However, Daley-Harris & Zimmerman (2009) 
pointed out that microfinance dose not usually serve the very poor including poor women, for whom it can 
represent a rout into debt rather than a way out of poverty.  
 
We found that microfinance activities have both encouraged and also created other intangible benefits too. 
There are many cases of cross ethnic cooperation in organized microfinance activities in multiethnic 
neighborhoods. This is a very common occurrence in Trincomalee and Batticaloa. This cooperation found to 
be having a multiplier and outward expanding effect. When the neighborhood group is multiethnic unit the 
market also becomes that of multiethnic clientele and suppliers as well. One very good example of this was a 
microfinance venture in Sirimapura ward of Trincomalee organized by a group of Sinhala and Muslim women. 
Their main economic activities are door to door selling of clothing items, catering and fish products. The 
clothing items are bought from Pamunuwa in Maharagama from mainly Sinhala traders by Muslim women 
and their clients are from all three ethnic communities. The producers and clientele of the other two activities 
similarly are multiethnic. Also Bernal-Garcia (2008) pointed out that the intervention of microfinance can 
have a socio-psychological effects through process mitigation of divergence among the different groups, 
besides its obvious economic impact. At the basis of this mechanism is the development of social contacts 
across individuals and groups. 
 
Since the Post conflict environment is complex, conflict does not affect all in a conflict region equally. There 
are also regional differences in terms of impact with some areas experiencing more adverse impact than 
others. There is also differential impact of conflict on individuals and social groups. Our study showed that in 
some areas and with some groups the success rate is more and this is due to various factors ranging from 
their capacities, experiences and overall destruction in the region as a whole. The poor and the vulnerable 
groups are the most affected and their war experience, damage to property and levels of trauma if far greater 
than those belonging to well-to-do social groups. There are war widows, displaced people and ex-combatants 
who have very different war time experience from each other and also from those who generally from upper 
social strata. Therefore, it is not possible to make microfinance engagement in post conflict environment 
without taking these complexities and diversities into account. Thinking of a uniform strategy is not possible 
and may be unproductive. These two variables in combination make several potential target groups with 
different capacity levels. The Table 2 gives a broad classification of the potential targets groups, their features 
and potential for success through microfinance initiatives. 
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Table 2: Different Target Groups, their Strengths and Weakness and Potential for MF Success  
 
Target Group 
Characteristics  
Potential for MF 
Success 
 
Trauma 
 
Skills 
 
Capacities   
 
Opportunities 
Refugees Extreme Vary None None None 
Resettled Recovering Vary Little Little Good 
Rehabilitated  
Ex-Combatants 
Recovering Better but not 
necessarily 
useful  
Less Little or None Good to  
very good 
War Widows  High  Little Little or 
None 
Little or  
None 
Least potential 
for success 
Other Female  
Headed HHs 
Little or 
Recovering 
Little Little Moderate to 
High 
Better than war 
widows 
Not affected but  
in the Conflict Area 
None or 
very little 
High High High Very High 
 
In the conflict affected Northeastern region, there are several distinct groups of potential beneficiaries with 
different needs, skills and capacities. The opportunities available to them are also different. The message 
there is that microfinance initiatives need to consider these circumstances and develop their intervention 
strategies accordingly. The package therefore needs to be a tailor made one to meet the differential needs of 
planned target group. Provision of credit alone will not guarantee that the recipients of credit use scarce 
capital in productive manner. Credit-plus services that include mainly the services that would assist 
entrepreneurs and the self-employed in developing their businesses are provided with, or prior to, the 
provision of key financial services. These services are increasingly being recognized as an important 
component of microfinance intermediation as they are associated with the viability and sustainability of the 
enterprise. These findings are consistent with Remenyi (2002), Colombage, Ahmad, & Chandrabose (2008) 
and Herath et al. (2016) highlighted that there is a significant difference between households who received 
credit with credit-plus services and those that received credit without credit-plus services on income 
increases. Credit-plus services benefitted the households to improve their level of income by the investment 
projects. The viability and sustainability of enterprises will in turn ensure financial viability and sustainability 
of the relevant microfinance institutions. Moral issues apart, there is also the question that microcredit is the 
best support for some groups. The following model outlines possible interventions with particular attention 
to the above complexities (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Different Vulnerable Groups and Possible Interventions Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The needs to endorse groups and other social mechanisms for the useful delivery of microfinance services 
have long been recognized. Relevance of groups for microfinance interventions are in two main areas. First, 
they are means of achieving objectives, namely, to harness social capital/resources in effective and positive 
manner. Second, they are also basis of planning interventions. This second role of groups is important any 
 
Target Group 
Intervention Strategy 
Credit only 
Strategy 
Credit-plus 
Strategy 
Social Funds 
of MF   
Financial Relief 
Strategy 
Refugees    √ 
Resettled  √ √ √ 
Rehabilitated Ex-
Combatants 
√ √   
Female Headed HHs  √ √  
War Widows   √ √ 
Not affected but in the 
Conflict Area 
√ √   
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intervention by microfinance initiative but it become particularly relevant in post conflict environment for its 
built in complexities.  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Though the North and East of the country had a vibrant agriculture based economy and a developed credit 
culture supported by a range of institutions, large scale microfinance engagement is primarily a post war 
phenomenon. Although it is early to make a comprehensive assessment the available secondary information 
and our field observations show that microfinance initiatives in the region are making an impact on the 
livelihood improvement of clients. The impact however is in varying degrees with certain areas and groups 
showing evidence of receiving more beneficial impacts on some communities compared to others. It also 
showed very high involvement of women and those women who are active in generally the ones who can be 
called empowered, namely, those from groups above the very poor and those who have comparatively better 
educational levels. Another interesting feature of successful microfinance venture groups display high level of 
support role played by husbands and also high levels of community cohesion. Another feature of the ongoing 
microfinance initiatives is that the relative concentration of successful ventures in areas that were relatively 
free of conflict. These include main towns, except a few like Kilinochchi and Mullaitive and rural areas that 
had been liberated before the final phase of the war and remained under government control for a long 
period. There are two reasons for this. First, in urban areas there is better market and also access to financial 
services and other facilities are high. There are as not being subjected to fighting directly there is less damage 
to infrastructural facilities, or having remained under government control for a longer period there is such 
facilities have been rebuilt. Second, other adverse conditions such as market distortions, lack of people with 
skills and reduced social capital, etc., caused due to population shifts/displacement of people is less felt in 
these areas.  
 
Microfinance strategies have both encouraged and also created other intangible benefits such as cross ethnic 
cooperation with organized microfinance activities in multiethnic neighborhoods. This is a very common 
occurrence in Eastern region. This cooperation is found to be having a multiplier and outward expanding 
effects. When the neighborhood group is multiethnic unit the market also becomes that of multiethnic 
clientele and suppliers too. In a post conflict environment, conflict has not affected all in a region equally. 
There are also regional differences in terms of impact with some areas experiencing more unfavorable 
impacts than others and the impact of conflict on individuals and social groups also could be different. This 
study showed that in some areas and with some groups benefitted from microfinance more. This is mainly 
due to various factors ranging from their capacities, experiences, knowledge and overall destruction in the 
region as a whole. The poor and the vulnerable are the most affected and their war experience, damage to 
property and levels of trauma if far greater than those belonging to well-to-do social groups. There are war 
widows, displaced people and ex-combatants who have very different war time experience from each other 
and also from those who are generally from upper social strata. Therefore, it is not possible to make 
microfinance intervention in post conflict environment without taking these complexities and divergence into 
account.  
 
Northeastern region in Sri Lanka is not a monolithic entity. There are several distinct groups of potential 
clients with different requirements, abilities and capacities. The economic and income earning opportunities 
available to them are also different. Therefore, the microfinance intermediaries need to be taking into 
consideration these conditions in high priority and design their intervention strategies accordingly. The 
microfinance package needs to be a tailor made one to achieve the multiple requirements of intended target 
groups. Provision of credit alone will not guarantee that the recipients of credit use scarce capital in a 
productive manner. Credit-plus services would assist entrepreneurs and the self-employed in developing 
their businesses are provided with, or prior to of key financial services. Apart from moral issues, there is also 
the question whether microcredit is the best support for some groups. It is necessary to endorse groups and 
other social mechanisms for the useful delivery of microfinance services which have long been recognized. 
Relevance of groups for microfinance interventions are in two major areas. First, they are means of achieving 
objectives, namely, to harness resources in effective and positive manner. Second, they are also basis of 
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planning interventions. This second role of groups is important any intervention by microfinance initiative 
but it become particularly relevant in post conflict environment with its built in complexities.  
 
References 
 
Bernal-Garcia. (2008). Post-Conflict Microfinance and Social Reconciliation: Overcoming Barriers through 
Process Mitigation. Standford Journal of Microfinance, 1(3).  
Chambers, R. (1995). Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts? Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies. 
Cheran, R. (2007). Transnationalism, Development and Social Capital: Tamil Community Networs in Canada. 
In G. Luin & K. Sailajah (Eds.), Organizing the Transnational: Experience of Asia and Latin American 
Migrants in Canada (pp. 277-305). Vancouver: The UBS Press. 
Christen, R. & Drake, D. (2002). Commercialization of Mocrofinance. In D. Drake & E. Rhyne (Eds.), 
Commercialization of Microfinance: Balancing Bussiness and Development. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian 
Press. 
Claessens, S. (2006). Access to Financial Services: A Review of the Issues and Public Policy Objectives: The 
World Bank. 
Colombage, S. S., Ahmad, A. & Chandrabose, A. S. (2008). Effectiveness of Microfinance in Reducing Rural 
Poverty: A Case Study of Selected Districts Sri Lanka. VISTAS, Journal of Humanities and Social Seinces, 
4, 1-37.  
Daley-Harris, S. & Zimmerman, J. (2009). Microfinance Does not Usually Serve the Very Poor, for Whom it Can 
Represent a Rout into Debt rather than Away Out of Poverty Enterprise Development and 
Microfinance, 20(2), 79-85.  
Doyle, D. (1998). Microfinance in the Wake of Conflict: Challenges and Opportunities. Microenterprise Best 
Practices (MBP) Paper. Retrieved from www.mbp.org website:  
GTZ. (2008). Outreach of financial Services in Sri Lanka, A Look at Demad-Side from a Microfinance 
Perspective, Sri Lanka  Colombo: German Development Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and 
Planning. 
GTZ. (2010). Promotion of the Microfinance Sector Operational District Profile. Colombo: GTZ. 
Herath, H. M. W. A. (2015). Impact of Microfinance on Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Sri Lanka. Modern Sri 
Lanka Studies A Journal of the Social Sciences, 6(1), 79-102.  
Herath, H. M. W. A., Guneratne, L. H. P. & Sanderatne, N. (2016). Impact of microfinance on women's 
empowerment: a case study on two microfinance institutions in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Journal of Social 
Sciences, 38(1), 51-61.  
Littlefield, E., Morduch, J. & Hashemi, S. (2003). Is Microfinance an Effective Strategy to Reach the Millennium 
Development Goals? Focus Note 24. Washongton DC: CGAP, Wold Bank. 
Lock-Desallien, R. (1996). Review of Poverty Concepts and Indicators Technical Support Document: UNDP. 
Marconi, R. & Mosely, P. (2006). Bolivia during the Global Crisis(1008-2004): Towards a Macroeconomics of 
Microfinance. Journal of International Development, 18, 237-261.  
Meehan, D. & Jennifer, M. (1999). Working Towards Institutional Financial Self-Sufficiency while Maintaining 
a Commitment to Seving the Poorest families. Joural of Microfinance, 1(1), 131-192.  
Morduch, J. (2000). The Microfinance Schism. World Developmwnt, 4(28), 617-629. 
Muneer, S., Ali, A. & Ahmad, R. A. (2017). Impact of Financing on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
Profitability with Moderating Role of Islamic Finance. Information Management and Business Review, 
9(2), 25-32  
Noreen, S. (2011). Role of Microfinance in Empowement of Femal Population of Bahawalpur District. Paper 
presented at the International Conference on Economics and Finance Research, IPEDR. 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.53772 
Otero, M. & Rhyne, E. (1994). The New World of Microenterprise Finance. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. 
Rappaport, J. (1986). Collaborating for Empowerment: Creating the language of mutual Help In R. H. Boyte 
(Ed.), The New Populiss: The Politics of Empowerment. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Remenyi, J. (2002). Microfinance: A Tool for Poverty Reduction. Sri Lanka Journal of Agrarian Studies, 10(1), 
52-69.  
Journal of Social and Development Sciences (ISSN 2221-1152) 
Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 6-21, June 2018 
21 
 
RIMHI. (1999). Guatemala: Never Again! The Official Report of the Human Rights Office, Archiocese of 
Guatemala. Maryknoll, New York. 
Sarvanathan, M. (2007). Economy of the Conflict Region in Sri Lanka: from Embargo to Repression. 
Washington: East West Centre. 
Sebstad, J. & Monique, C. (2000). Microfinance, Risk Management and Poverty. Washington DC: USAID. 
Shaw, J. & Matthew, C. (n.d). Risky Business in Bougainville: Implementing Microfinancein Post-Conflict 
Environments. RMIT University: International Develoment Programme, Melbourne. 
Whitmore, E. K. P.  (1988). Participation, Empowerment and Welfare. Canadian Review of Social Policy, 22, 51-
60.  
Wilson, T. (2001). Microfinance during and after Armed Conflict: Lessons from Angola, Cambodia, 
Mozambique and Rwanda. Durham, UK: Springfield Centre. 
Wimalaraja, I. & Cheran, R. (2010). Empowering Diasporas: The Dynamics of Post War Transnational Tamil 
Politics Burghof Occational Paper. Berlin: Bughof Peace Support. 
Wlliams, A., Uch, V. & Soeng, V. N. (2001). Post-Conflict Microfinance in Cambodia. Durham, UK: Springfield 
Centre. 
Woller, G. M., Christopher, D. & Warner, W. (2001). Where to Microfinance? Microcredit and Development 
Policy, 1(1).  
World-Bank. (2002). Wold Development Report. New York: World Bank. 
